3.2.3.2 Bail conditions
Most sections under the IPC that are used in OGBV cases are bailable in nature, except Section 354 (assault of or use of criminal force on a woman with the intent to outrage her modesty) which is used commonly in cases of sexual harassment.
While bail in criminal cases has to be the rule, courts often use sexist and patriarchal reasoning to grant bail in OGBV cases. Such reasoning focuses on the character of the complainant as opposed to the behavior of the accused or the details of the crime. For instance, in a case involving NCIID and blackmail, the court’s reasoning for granting bail contained a strong reference to the fact that the prosecutrix, a married woman, had consensual sex with the accused and that there was a delay of more than a year in filing the complaint.
Another issue in granting bail is that bail conditions do not reflect a sufficient understanding of the online public sphere and the role of technology in mediating violence, and are inadequate to reduce harm to the victim while the accused is at large. Bail orders are not customized to the unique requirements of OGBV cases and impose the same conditions as cases where the harm is not technologically inflicted.
Further, we also need to caution against a disturbing trend in bail conditions imposed in gender-based violence cases, where the accused and the prosecutrix are asked to compromise or the former is asked to tie rakhi — an amulet or talisman tied around the wrist of a man typically on a Hindu festival to set up brotherly relations — to the latter, thereby enabling their contact, which can lead to trauma and revictimization of the survivor.
3.2.3.3 Difficulty in proving guilt and evidentiary value of testimony
Cases of OGBV are mostly dealt with under the criminal jurisdiction of courts, as they constitute offenses under the IPC and the IT Act. As a result, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to offer adequate evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. However, our study found that several cases of OGBV fail to meet the high burden of proof because of hindrances such as bringing in expert testimony, relying on witnesses, and offering the right documentary evidence, among others.
Another hurdle is the court’s treatment of the victim’s testimony. The Supreme Court’s ruling that a conviction may be based solely on the victim’s testimony is conditional on such testimony being sterling, meaning that it must be unassailable and consistent throughout the court process. Although the Supreme Court simultaneously clarified that minor contradictions would not suffice to disregard a testimony, defense lawyers routinely and successfully, seek to poke holes in a victim’s testimony through a barrage of questions and by creating an environment that is hostile to the victim. The Supreme Court’s expectation that a sterling witness must “withstand the cross-examination of any length and however strenuous” is problematic in light of the trauma and fear faced by victims during a testimony. What’s more? Judges base the credibility of a woman’s testimony on the extent to which she fits the paradigm of an ideal victim. IT for Change’s study documented several such instances. For example, in a rape case with elements of OGBV, one of the reasons cited by the court to grant bail to the accused was that the victim had failed to report the crime immediately, which the court deemed not “becoming” of a rape victim.
3.2.3.4 Admission of digital evidence
The difficulty of proving guilt is compounded by the unique challenges faced in the production and admissibility of electronic or digital evidence. Such evidence is crucial in OGBV cases since the record of wrongdoing or harm is captured on a device or the internet.
Admission of digital evidence is governed by Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act. Section 65B(1) of the Act differentiates between an original electronic record contained in a device in which the information was first stored and secondary copies made from the original which may be produced (example, handwritten copies) or printed on a paper, and stored, recorded, or copied in optical or magnetic media. The former can be directly adduced as evidence if the owner of the device steps into the witness box and proves that the concerned device, on which the original information was first stored, is owned and/or operated by them. The latter can be admitted as evidence only if it meets certain requirements specified by Section 65B (2), and more importantly, if a certificate is produced in accordance with Section 65B(4), which identifies the electronic record, and gives particulars of the device involved in the production of the electronic record. The certificate has to be given by the person occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device, such as the owner. This certification requirement is “to ensure the source and authenticity of the electronic evidence, which are the two hallmarks pertaining to electronic record sought to be used as evidence”.
In most cases of OGBV involving electronic evidence, the production of secondary evidence is more feasible than primary evidence because of the difficulty or sometimes the impracticability of bringing into the court the computer system or computer network where the electronic evidence was first stored. However, the requirement of certification poses hurdles in admitting secondary copies of electronic records as evidence before the court. In some cases, it may not be possible to obtain the certificate if the litigant is not in possession of the electronic device storing the electronic document. Sometimes despite applying to the authority holding the electronic document, a certificate under Section 65B(4) may not be available. In other cases, the litigant may not be aware of who the concerned authority is to issue such a certificate.
Our study of OGBV cases heard in trial courts across Delhi and Bengaluru found that electronic evidence was often not considered due to the lack of the requisite certification. In State by Sampigehalli Police Station, Bengaluru v. Faiz Ahamed (2016), a case of non-consensual capture of intimate image and intimidation, electronic evidence was provided through compact discs (CDs), copies of email, color photocopies of the photographs, and printouts. However, since the prosecution had not produced the certificate for secondary evidence under Section 65B(4), the trial court refused to admit the evidence and acquitted the accused. This is only one instance of how strict application of the certification requirement could make the production and admission of secondary electronic evidence prohibitively difficult for victims of OGBV.
In light of these difficulties, the Supreme Court, in Shafhi Mohammed v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018), held that certification under Section 65B(4) is not mandatory and can be dispensed with “in the interest of justice” in cases where the device is inaccessible to the person seeking to obtain the certificate (such as where it is in adverse possession). However, the court overruled its own judgment in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao & Ors. (2020), on the ground that the ruling in Shafhi Mohammed case was based on an incorrect reading of the law, thereby making the certificate requirement mandatory once again. To mitigate the rigors of the provision, the court ruled that a person unable to access a device or obtain a certificate must approach the court, which is empowered to order the production of an electronic record under Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act and other provisions of civil and criminal procedure codes. In other words, while the certificate is mandatory, if the prosecution is unable to obtain the certificate, it can apply to the court, which in turn, can exercise its powers to direct the competent person to issue the certificate. In this way, the procedural difficulties are sought to be mitigated by the exercise of the court’s power to summon evidence and the necessary certificate.
Apart from the issue of admissibility of secondary electronic records, our study also found that courts, in certain cases, did not consider electronic evidence even when it was present. In other cases, the prosecution failed to produce such secondary evidence. This is concerning as electronic evidence is a crucial part of OGBV cases, without which justice is impossible to achieve.
3.2.3.5 Stigma and patriarchy in the courtroom
For survivors of OGBV, testifying in court can lead to retraumatization, since they are required to remember – and, in a sense, relive – a traumatic event. Survivors report that the fear, loss of control, intimidation, and physical symptoms, such as pain they experienced during the assault return before the testimony. Although in-camera trials and measures to maintain victims’ anonymity are meant to reduce re-traumatization, victims still need to enter the courtroom in public view and have their cases announced on a common notice board.
Besides, courtrooms continue to be sexist and patriarchal spaces for survivors of gender-based violence and OGBV. The Supreme Court, in 2021, noted several instances of sexism by judges in sexual assault cases, such as victim-blaming and patriarchal bail conditions. In the online context, one of the key findings from IT for Change's study of OGBV cases is the prevalence of sexist stereotypes and patriarchal statements in the courtrooms from the Bench as well as the lawyers arguing before them. These included making unwarranted assumptions about a woman’s modesty or chastity based on her actions; unduly focusing on the age, occupation, or marital status of a woman; expecting certain typical reactions from the woman survivor, etc. Sexist and patriarchal observations and judgments by courts also stem from an attitude of benevolent sexism. As an IT for Change study notes:
“Statements that fall within the ambit of benevolent sexism are usually not overtly misogynistic or hateful towards women, but are rooted in ‘a desire to protect and preserve women’, rather than safeguarding their inherent rights of privacy, dignity, and equality. Cases of benevolent sexism are usually decided in favor of the survivors – and this is the same when courts consider online gender-based offences, but the reasoning is flawed and steeped in patriarchal and paternalistic notions of protection of women. This takes away from the hard-fought agency of a woman, and fails in providing an equal interpretation of the law.”
Here is an example of benevolent sexism. In Lalit Bhola v. State (2018), the petitioner sought to quash the FIR registered against him for the creation of fake accounts in the name of the complainant on a website used for the sale and purchase of commodities. The stated ground for the petition was that the FIR was registered as an offshoot of a matrimonial dispute and that the parties have now settled the dispute by entering into a Settlement Agreement. The complainant woman also made a request to quash the FIR. The Delhi High Court noted the request of the woman to not pursue the proceedings, and observed, “[F]acts of the case show how big the heart of a woman is. She even after being humiliated at the hands of her husband is willing to forgive him and forget his conduct.” Given that the court could have quashed the FIR just on the basis of the settlement agreement, this observation was unwarranted. It only reinforces a benevolent sexist attitude that paints a positive view of traditional gender roles, where women are expected to be maternal and caring.
To be sure, the judiciary is not oblivious to the issue of sexism towards survivors of gender-based offenses. The Supreme Court in Aparna Bhat v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021), set down guidelines to ensure that bail conditions imposed by courts did not include compromise between the accused/perpetrator and the victim. Additionally, the Supreme Court asked all courts to be sensitive towards victims in cases of gender-based violence to avoid retraumatization during proceedings and arguments. This is a welcome judgment from the highest court in the country and needs to be incorporated by the judiciary in letter and spirit. Additionally, in August 2023, the Supreme Court of India released a Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes. The handbook contains a glossary of gender-unjust terms and suggests alternative words or phrases which may be used while drafting pleadings as well as orders and judgments. It also identifies common stereotypes about women and demonstrates why they are inaccurate and how they may distort the application of the law.
Going forward, courts’ discussions on consent and the sexual agency of women need to be analyzed through a feminist lens. In certain cases, courts have been unable to acknowledge women’s sexual agency and have, instead, adopted a protectionist approach. In others, courts have ignored multiple consents that may be involved in OGBV cases like NCIID. There needs to be an appreciation by the judiciary of the fact that privacy is often contextually implicated and that active consent faces challenges in light of social and gender power that vitiates free choice.
3.2.3.6 Redressal from the court
If a criminal prosecution leads to conviction, the end result is either imprisonment and/or the imposition of a fine on the accused. While this meets the ends of justice in some sense, it is doubtful if it really redresses the harm caused to a survivor of OGBV if the offensive image or content, around which the case is centered, is still up on the internet and open to be shared with anyone. Many instances of OGBV occur on platforms of internet intermediaries, such as social media, which are in a position to remove the offensive content. In fact, Section 79 of the IT Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015), empowers courts to issue directions to intermediaries to remove illegal content from their platform. As per proviso 2 of Rule 3(1)(d) of the IT Rules, upon receipt of a court order to take down content, the intermediary is required to do so within 36 hours. If it fails to comply with such an order, the safe harbor exemption available to intermediaries under Section 79(1) of the IT Act is forfeited, and the intermediary entity and its officers can be held liable for action as mandated by Section 85 of the IT Act.
IT for Change’s study found that courts recognized the role of social media platforms or relevant intermediaries and requested their cooperation to remove the offensive content in only a few cases. In fact, orders to take down offensive content should not wait till the end of the trial, as is sometimes the case, since the continued presence of such content online during the trial period can cause significant harm to the complainant. In a particular case from our study sample, the accused persons continued to repost and redirect the offending content from one website to another, and from one online platform to another during the course of the trial. It is crucial, therefore, that courts issue interim orders directing the removal of such content while the litigation is still underway. Given the challenges of cross-functioning between the state, the intermediaries, including social media platforms and websites, and the court, the intermediaries should be included as parties in the trial to ease the process of effectively enforcing content takedown orders. Currently, the intermediaries are not included as parties, thereby impeding the ability of complainants to get the illegal content removed from the internet.